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SIMPLIFIED PROCEDURE FOR COURT
DETERMINATION OF DISPUTES UNDER NEW
YORK'S CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
Jay C. Carlisle*

The introduction of the Individual Assignment System
(US)' in 1986, and recently enacted laws addressing tort reform2 and alternative dispute resolution3 have heightened the
debate between the bar and judiciary as to the most appropriate
method of managing efficiently' the high volume of cases in New
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; J.D. University of California a t
Davis, A.B. University of California a t Los Angeles. The author is grateful to John Mulligan and Gail Matthews for their research assistance. He dedicates this article to Professor Peter J. O'Connor, who is a true dean of New York Civil Practice.
N.Y. COMP.CODESR & REGS.tit. 22, 3 202.3(a) (1986). See notes 237-39 and accompanying text infra. See generally Brodsky, Civil Practice, 37 SYRACUSE
L. REV.264,
288 (1986); Carlisle, Annual Survey of New York Civil Practice, 38 SYRACUSE
L.REV.67,
83-85 (1987); The Uniform Rules Take Effect (January 6, 1986), Part I: The Individual
Assignment System, 312 N.Y. ST. L. DIG. 1 (Dec. 1985) [hereinafter Individual Assignment System]; Text of Review Panel's Report on IAS (IAS Study Report by Office of
Court Administration), N.Y.L.J., Feb. 24, 1987, a t 5, col. 1. "Plaintiffs are 'far more successful' in the 1980's than they were in the previous 20 years, a Rand Corp. study of civil
verdicts in California and Cook County, Ill., discovers. In Cook County, plaintiffs moved
from winning one fourth of products liability and malpractice cases in the 1960s to winning half such trials in the 1980's; the average malpractice award more than tripled." '87
EVENTS: March, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 4, 1988, a t S-6, col. 2.
See notes 7-13 and accompanying text infra. ABA's House of Delegates on March
2,1987 "approves a tort reform policy that rejects caps on damages recovered by injured
plaintiffs for pain and suffering, but recommends greater judicial scrutiny of damage
awards. '87 EVENTS: March, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 4, 1988, a t S-6, col. 2.
Ch. 156, [I9841 N.Y. Laws (McKinney) (makes the Community Dispute Resolution Centers Program a permanent component of the New York Unified Court System);
Ch. 91, [I9851 N.Y. Laws 405 (McKinney) (chapter 91 allows Community Dispute Resolution Centers to make monetary awards equal to the monetary jurisdiction of the Small
Claims Part of Justice Courts); Ch. 837, [I9861 N.Y. Laws 1967 (McKinney) (allowing
selected felony cases to be referred to an alternative dispute resolution center with the
consent of the people, the defendant and the victim).
' See Wise, IAS 'Effective' in First Year But Needs Some Improvement, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 20, 1987, a t 1, col. 3 [hereinafter Wise, IAS 'Effective']; Johnson, New York Court
Study Says System is Faster, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1987, a t B1, col. 2; Baetich, IAS
'Unworkable' (letter to the editor), N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4,1987, a t 2, col. 6; Bellacosa, Alternative Dispute Plan Improves Justice System, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 28, 1987, a t 25, col. 1. See
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York state c o ~ t sAlthough
.~
the IAS has reduced court congestion, an estimated eighteen percent of the cases now pending
before the courts have been in the judicial system longer than
. ~ addition, changes relating to the statute of
fifteen r n ~ n t h s In
limitations for products liability actions,? joint and several liability: itemized verdicts: periodic payments of awards,1° payments

generally Broder, Trial Tactics, Techniques: Sauce for the Gander, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 9,
1986, at 1, col. 1; McLaughlin, New Joint, Several Liability Law: Problems for Lawyers
and Judges, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 1,1986, at 1, col. 3; Cook, N.Y. Law Likely to Spur Filings of
Toxic-Tort Claims, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 22, 1986, at 16, col. 1; Connors, An Analysis of New
York's Medical Malpractice Reform, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 15, 1986, at 1, col. 3; Mollen, Bar's
Cooperation Urged for New I.A.S. to Succeed, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 15,1986, at 29, col. 1; Wise,
Individual Assignment System Begins Operations Today, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 6, 1986, at 1,
col. 2. See generally Wise, Battle Lines Are Being Drawn I n Fight Over Toxic Tort Law,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 1, col. 3; Law Signed to Extend Time for Filing Toxic-Tort
Suits, N.Y.L.J., July 31, 1986, at 1, col. 3; Rheingold, The New Statute of Limitations i n
Tort Actions i n New York, N.Y.L.J., July 29, 1986, at 1, col. 3; Hoenig, More on Tort
Reform - The New Statutes, N.Y.L.J., July 24, 1986, at 1, col. 1; Marlin & Levy, New
York Adopts Discovery Rule for Latent-Disease Cases, N.Y.L.J., July 7 , 1986, at 1, col.
3; Fox, Interim Report by Governor's Commission: Reforms i n Liability Insurance
Urged by State Advisory Panel, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 8,1986, at 1, col. 3; Memorandum o f Sen.
Stafford (this memorandum by Senator Ronald B. Stafford o f the New York State Senate accompanied Senate Bill 9391A and discussed the purpose o f a discovery statute of
limitation rule) (available in files o f the Brooklyn Law Review).
Over 3.5 million actions were filed i n New York state courts during 1987. CASELOAD
ACTIVITYREPORTING
SYSTEMOF T H E OFFICE
OF COURTADMINISTRATION
OF T H E U N I F I E D
COURTSYSTEMOF T H E STATEOF NEW YORK(1987) (statistical breakdown o f actions filed
in New York state courts) (available in the files o f the Brooklyn Law Review). See also
T h e Hon. Chief Judge Sol Wachtler, Remarks at the Annual Dinner of the New York
State Bar Association (Jan. 17, 1986) (available in the files o f the Brooklyn Law Review).
Judge Wachtler notes that the number o f cases disposed o f each year b y New York state
courts is ten times the number o f cases disposed o f each year by the entire federal judiciary.). See also REPORTT O T H E CHIEFJUDGEAND CHIEFADMINISTRATIVE
JUDGEOF T H E
REVIEWCOMMITTEE
ON 1986 INDMDUAL ASSIGNMENT
SYSTEMOPERATIONS
6-8 (1987)
[hereinafter REPORTTO T H E CHIEF
JUDGE];
EIGHTH
ANNUAL
REPORTOF T H E CHIEF
ADMINISTRATOR OF T H E COURTS
2-1 (1986) [hereinafter CHIEF
ADMINISTRATOR'S
REPORT](available i n the files of the Brooklyn Law Review).
See note 248 and accompanying text infra.
N.Y. CIV.PRAC.L. & R 3 214-c (McKinney Supp. 1988), as enacted by Ch. 682,
[I9861 N.Y. Laws 1565 (McKinney) (significantly alters the three year statute o f limitations for personal injury and property damage cases b y providing that the period starts
t o run from the date o f discovery, and thus revives certain causes o f action that would
have been time barred).
N.Y. CIV.PRAC.L. & R. 1600-1603 (McKinney Supp. 1988), as enacted by Ch.
682, [I9861 N.Y. Laws 1565 (McKinney) (transforms the law of joint and several liability
i n tort cases by limiting the liability o f persons jointly liable).
N.Y. CIV.PRAC.L. & R. 8 4111(f) (McKinney Supp. 1988), as enacted by Ch. 682, $i
7 , [I9861 N.Y. Laws 1569 (McKinney) (requires that upon a finding o f damages, courts
must instruct the jury to specify the applicable elements o f special and general damages
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from collateral sources,ll health care arbitration,12and court-imposed sanctions for frivolous claimsls are placing additional burdens on an already overworked judiciary.14
Although concern over increasing court congestion has led
to the adoption of several simplified means of resolving disputes,16 many commentators argue that more efforts should be
made to divert court cases into both formal and informal statutory dispute resolution areas.16 They champion methods such as
on which the award is based and the amount assigned to each element).
l o N.Y. CIV.Pmc. L. & R. $ 5041 (McKinney Supp. 1988), as enacted b y Ch. 682,
[I9861 N.Y. Laws 1570 (McKinney) (requires that the jury render a verdict that itemizes
damages between past special, past general, future special, and future general damages).
" N.Y. CN. PRAC.L. & R. !j 4545 (McKinney Supp. 1988), as enacted b y Ch. 220, !j
36, [I9861 N.Y. Laws 386 (McKinney) (applicable to personal injury, property damage or
wrongful death actions where a plaintiff seeks to recover economic losses - i f the court
determines that any past or future expense will be indemnified in whole or i n part from
any collateral source, it must reduce the plaintiffs recovery).
l a N.Y. CN. Pmc. L. & R. !j 3045 (McKinney Supp. 1988), as enacted b y Ch. 266, $ 3 ,
[I9861 N.Y. Laws 472 (McKinney) (defendant may demand that plaintiff consent to arbitration upon a cession o f liability i n medical and dental malpractice cases).
l 3 N.Y. CIV.Pmc. L. & R. $ 8303-a (McKinney Supp. 1988), as enacted b y Ch. 220,!j
35, [I9861 N.Y. Laws 386 (McKinney) (applicable to actions for personal injury, property
damage or wrongful death cases and provides that in the event any party files a frivolous
claim or defense, courts may award reasonable costs and attorney fees). For a discussion
o f the new laws, see Carlisle, supra note 1, at 79-82.
" See note 5 supra, and notes 149-56 and accompanying text infra.
I V e e 9 U.S.C. $ 3 (1982) (Arbitration Act); N.Y. INS. LAW $ 5106(b) (McKinney
1985) (compulsory arbitration o f no-fault claims at option o f insured); N.Y. LAB. LAW !j
716(2) (McKinney 1977) (compulsory arbitration o f labor grievance against non-profit
hospital); N.Y. Cm. Pmc. L. & R. $ 3405 (McKinney Supp. 1988) (permitting chief judge
o f Court o f Appeals to promulgate rules for arbitration o f claims not exceeding $6,000
pending in any court). See generally Cooke, T h e Highways and Byways of Dispute Resolution, 55 ST. JOHN'SL. REV.611 (1981);Goldstein, Alternatives for Resolving Business
Transaction Disputes, 58 ST. JOHN'SL. REV. 69 (1983).
Bellacosa, supra note 4, at 28, col. 4. See H. ZEISEL,H. &VEN
& B. BUCHHOLZ,
DELAYI N T H E COURT(2d ed. 1978);Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary,
69 A . B A J. 442 (1983);see also Breger, The Justice Conundrum, 28 VILL.L. REV. 923,
952-55 (1983);Green, Marks & Olson, Settling Large Case Litigation: A n Alternate Approach, 11 LOY. L.AL. REV. 493, 501 (1978); Neighborhood Justice of Chicago - The
Success and the Challenge, 18 DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
1,16 (1986) (prepared b y the American Bar Association Special Committee on Dispute Resolution); Zinman, Mediation or
BAR JOURNAL
151 (1985);Lewin, BusArbitration of Insurance Claims, 12 WESTCHESTER
iness and the Law: The Big Debate Over Litigation, N.Y. Times, May 13, 1986, at D2,
col. 1; Metaxas, Alternatives to Litigation are Maturing, Nat'l L.J., May 12, 1986, at 1,
col. 3; Judges End Cases Faster Using Trial Alternatives, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1986, at
AS, col. 1; Danforth, A Need for Uniform Laws, Faster Trials, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1,1985
$ 3, at 2, col. 3; Brodeur, Annals of Law: T h e Asbestos Industry on Trial, THE NEW
YORKER,
July 1, 1985, at 36; Coca-Cola General Counsel Praises Mini-Trial, Arbitration
Times, Winter 1986, at 5, col. 1 (American Arbitration Association Dispute Resolution
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arbitration," administrative proceedings,ls summary jury trials,19 mini-trials,2O mediation:'
private
and
News); Chief Justice Supports Arbitration, Arbitration Times, Fall 1985, at 1, col. 1;
ADR Theme of New York Arbitration Day, Arbitration Times, Summer 1985, at 1, col. 4
(remarks on May 10, 1985 at eighth annual Arbitration Day of AAA); Sander, Report on
the National Conference on Minor Disputes Resolution (May 1977) ( A B A Report on
Dispute Resolution) (available in the files o f the Brooklyn Law Review); CBS Evening
News Special Report, Sept. 6, 1985 (over one million workers each year are being fired
and many o f them seek redress in courts o f law).
See E. JOHNSON,
V . KANTOR& E. SCHWARTZ,
OUTSIDE
T H E COURTS:
A SURVEYOF
DIVERSION
ALTERNATIVES
I N CIVILCASES39 (1977) [hereinafter JOHNSON,
KANTOR&
SCHWARTZ]
("Arbitration is the most significant alternative forum which has developed
i n the United States."); Ferguson, The Adjudication of Commercial Disputes and the
Legal System i n Modern England, 7 BRIT.J. L. & SOC'Y141, 145 (1980) ("The presentday position is that arbitration is firmly established as the most used adjudicative mechanism."); Green, Marks & Olson, supra note 16, at 494-95 ("Arbitration stands as almost
the only well-developed alternative t o full-scale litigation for entities which find themselves embroiled in disputes which cannot be solved through normal business negotiations!'); Nader & Singer, Law i n the Future: What Are the Choices?, 51 CAL. ST. B.J.
281, 284 (1976) ("Arbitration has developed without the aid o f the judicial system - in
fact, despite its early opposition."). See generally M. DOMKE,
T H ELAW AND PRACTICE
OF
COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION
$8 1.01-1.03 (1968);S. LAZARUS,
J. BRAY,L. CARTER,
K. COLLINS,
& G. WILLARD,
RESOLVING
BUSINESS
DISPUTES:
THE
B. GIEDT,R. HOLTON,P. MA~THEWS
OF COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION
35-40 (1965).
POTENTIAL
l8 See B. SCHWARTZ,
ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW (2d ed. 1984); Breger, The APA: An Administrative Conference Perspective, 72 VA. L. REV.337 (1986);Sargentich, The Reform
of the American Administrative Process: The Contemporary Debate, 1984 W I S .L. REV.
385 (1984);Symposium on Administrative Law, 19 NEW ENG.L. REV. 693 (1984). See
also Gifford, The New York State Administrative Procedure Act: Some Reflections
Upon Its Structure and Legislative History, 26 BUFFALO
L. REV.589 (1977). See notes
100-13 and accompanying text infra.
Is Metaxas, supra note 16, at 1, col. 3. See Wikinson, Alternative Dispute Resolution - The Summary Jury Trial, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 13, 1987, at 1, cols. 3-4. See notes 12631 and accompanying text infra.
20 See Dalton, Benefits of Mini-Trials Discussed by Attorneys, Arbitration Times,
Fall 1986, at 7 , col. 1; Green, Marks & Olson, supra note 16. See also notes 144-48 and
accompanying text infra.
21 W . S I M K I &
N Ii. FIDANDIS,MEDIATION
AND T H E DYNAMICS
OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 23-35 (2d ed. 1986) (mediation is defined as active intervention from a neutral third
party who employs non-adversarial techniques in attempting t o reach a negotiated settlement). See generally Silberman & Schepard, Court-Ordered Mediation i n Family
741,741-42 nn.4 &
Disputes: The New York Proposal, 14 N.Y.U. REV.L. & SOC.CHANGE
5 (1986).
22 Cratsley, Community Courts: Offering Alternative Dispute Resolution Within
the Judicial System, 3 VT. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1978) (screening is an informal process in
which a third party narrows the issues for trial).
23 In private trials, disputes are resolved by non-government private courts, presided
over by former judges and experts in the contested matter. Areas of dispute resolution
handled by private tribunals include "personal injury claims, uninsured and underinsured motorist insurance coverage, first party automobile insurance claims, tort litigation, commercial disputes, labor and employment rights litigation, domestic relations is-
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community dispute resolution ~enters.2~
Other commentators argue that the perception of crisis in the courts is overblown and
that alternative dispute resolution forums needlessly duplicate
functions that should be performed by courts.26This debate has
focused primarily on when the judicial decisionmaking process
should be replaced by alternative dispute resolution forums. No
commentator has yet addressed the issue of whether New York's
Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Disputes
(SPCDD),2e enacted in 1956,2=offers an acceptable method for
minimizing court congesti0n.2~
The SPCDD is available for the resolution of any justiciable
sues and intra-professional disputes." Castro, Public Service, Private Profits, TIME,
Feb.
10, 1986, at 64 (describes phenomenon in justice system known as "privatization," which
is becoming increasingly commonplace across the United States). See Silas, Costly Law
Suits, 72 A B A J., July 1, 1986, at 19, col. 1.; De Sando, Rented Scales of Justice Ends
\irait for Day i n Court, Asbury Park Press, June 23, 1986,at Al, col. 1;Tolchin, Private
Courts With Binding Rulings Draw Interest and Some Challenges, N.Y. Times, May 12,
1985, at 38, col. 1 (private courts thrive because people do not have access t o congested
public courts).
Concerns esist that private courts short-cut procedural guarantees that make u p our
INC.,ANNUALREPORT1985 (brochure describing a naconcept o f fairness. See JUDICATE,
tionat private court system) (available i n the files o f the Brooklyn Law Review); see
notes 120-29and accompanying t e s t infra.
24 Christian, Community Dispute Resolution: First-Class Process or Second-Class
Justice?, 14 N.Y.U. REV.L. & SOC.CHANGE
771 (1986). See notes 149-52and accompanying test infra. See also Bellacosa, supra note 4, at 28, col. 4.
" Study Shows No Litigation Explosion in America, 19 DISPUTERESOLUTION
3
(1986) (referring t o study released b y National Center for State Courts indicating that
current growth o f litigation is due primarily to population growth). See Motley, W h y W e
are a Nation of Litigators, 6 U. BRIDGEPORT
L. REV. 9, 17 (litigation tide that currently
engulfs us is healthy and has its roots i n American judicial system); Resnik, Tiers, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 840, 942 (1984) (numbers other than filing rates must be examined t o account for increased litigation); Metasas, supra note 16, at 8,col. 3 (time saving contemplated by alternative dispute resolution less than anticipated). See also Resnik, Managerial Judges and Court Delay: T h e Unproven Assumptions, 23 JUDGESJ. 8, 11 (1984)
("[Ilt is difficult t o isolate and weigh accurately the actual effect ( i f any) o f managerial
judging on the speed o f trial court disposition.").
l6 See N.Y. CIV.PRAC.L. & R. $8 3031-3037 (McKinney 1974).
27 Ch. 219, [I9561 N.Y. Laws 249 (McKinney).
l8 For a general discussion o f New York's Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Disputes (SPCDD), see Goldstein, supra note 15,at 83-87;T h e Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 46 ST. JOHN'SL. REV. 355, 373-74 (1971); Legislation, 28
BROOKLYN
L. REV.133 (1961);JaEe, Simplified Procedure for Determination of Disputes
Compared with Arbitration and Ordinary Litigation, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 14, 1961,at 4,col. 1;
Tripp, Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Contract Disputes: Judicial
"Arbitration" in New York, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1961, at 4, col. 1; Callahan, New Simplified Procedure Act, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 24, 1961, at 4, col. 1.
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controversy, provided both sides agree to its applicati0n.3~The
procedure has been utilized in a variety of contexts, including
commercial, matrimonial, real property, and collective bargaining disputes;s0 however, its application has yet to be extended
into the area of tort law.s1 The SPCDD offers a simplified procedures2 that dispenses with summonses and ~omplaints,9~
prePg See 3 J. WEINSTEIN,
H. KORN& A. MILLER,NEWYORKCIVILPRACTICE
ll 3031.02
(1986) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER];D. SIEGEL,HANDBOOK
ON NEW YORK
P R A C ~ C$E609, at 876 (1978) ("[The SPCDD] is apparently available for any subject
matter . . . ."); 0.CHASE.CIVILLITIGATION
IN NEWYORK§ 23.05 (1983) ("Any justiciable
controversy, regardless of subject matter, may be submitted to the court."). See also
FIFTHANN.REP. N.Y. JUD.
CONFERENCE
103 (1960) [hereinafter FIFTHANNUAL
REPORT],
which states in material part:
While it may be expected that this new procedure will be used most frequently
by the business community, because of its peculiar needs, there is no provision
barring its use by other persons in cases not connected with commerce. Indeed,
there is no reason why this procedure should not be available to any parties
who feel they would like t~ use it, in any type case, even in negligence actions.
I t is also felt that any attempt to limit the use of the procedure to "merchants"
in "commercial disputes" would be unwise. A great deal of unnecessary litigation might be caused in the attempt to work out a final definition of these
terms.

Id.
30 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t ll 3031.02 n.13 (citing Soffer v.
Elmerdorf, 108 A.D.2d 954, 484 N.Y.S.2d 941 (3d Dep't 1985) (action by attorneys for
legal fees due); Aloi v. Bd. of Educ. of W. Babylon, 81 A.D.2d 874,439 N.Y.S.2d 169 (2d
Dep't 1981) (action for declaratory judgment and money damages for breach of collective
bargaining agreement); Gerstein v. 532 Broad Hollow Rd. Co., 75 A.D.2d 292, 429
N.Y.S.2d 195 (1st Dep't 1980) (action for monies due based on breach of contract for
first refusal in sale of real property); Kessler v. Kessler, 24 A.D.2d 601,262 N.Y.S.2d 288
(2d Dep't 1965), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 796,218 N.E.2d 299, 271 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1966) (actions
for an accounting and declaration of rights of parties arising out of real estate venture);
Eagle Star Ins. Co. of America v. Gen. Accident, Fire & Life Ins. Co., 100 Misc. 2d 792,
420 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1979) (action to apportion liability between two
insurers who agreed to total settlement amount); Gutman v. Sal-Vio Masons, Inc., 72
Misc. 2d 729, 339 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 1972) (action for purchase price of
construction materials sold and delivered); Hammerstein v. Woodlawn Cemetery, 21
Misc. 2d 42, 194 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1960) (dispute over burial rights)).
' 3 WEINSTEIN,
3
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t ll 3031.02 (citing N.Y. Kandy
Kard Corp. v. Barton's Candy Corp., 32 A.D.2d 513, 298 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1st Dep't 1969)
(although contract provided for use of SPCDD, the court found that issues sounding in
tort'did not come under that provision; that defendant had waived use of SPCDD by
participating in litigation; and that it would be wasteful to use different procedures in
the same case)).
The SPCDD developed from a suggestion in 1955 by the Hon. David W. Peck,
Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division, First Department, to John B. Johnson, State
Administrator of Courts, that a simplified means of handling court cases might be feasible. See SEVENTH
ANN. REP. N.Y.JUD.CONFERENCE
88 (1962) [hereinafter SEVENTH
ANNUAL REPORT].
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trial disclosure,3' trial by
most of the ordinary rules of
interlocutory appeals from nonfinal orders:? and
The impetus for the enactment of the simplified procedure was the desire to provide
an expeditious means of hearing and determining commercial controversies that the business community had increasingly resolved through arbitration, however, the statutory
provisions have never been restricted to commercial disputes. FIFTH ANNUAL
REPORT,
supra note 29, a t 103. The original proposal by the Judicial Conference for broadening
the provisions was based on the simplified procedure promulgated for the British Commercial Court and would have specifically limited application of this procedure to commercial disputes. FIFTHANNUAL
REPORT,
supra note 29, a t 96-106. That proposed statute
was found to be "cumbersome and formidable in appearance." SEVENTH
ANNUAL
REPORT,
supra, a t 88. Because section 218-a was available only to parties to a current dispute,
who could agree to submit their controversy to the courts pursuant to the SPCDD, it was
of limited use to the business community. The Judicial Conference recognized this and
recommended that the applicability of the simplified procedure be broadened to permit
parties to a contract to provide that any future disputes be litigated pursuant to the
SPCDD. THIRD
ANN.REP. N.Y. JUD.
CONFERENCE
104-06 (1958). Thereafter, the Conference proposed amendments to clarify section 218-a and expand the procedure by adding
two additional sections. FIFTHANNUAL
REPORT,supra note 29, a t 96-97. These sections
and the rules promulgated to govern them were incorporated into the draft of the Civil
Practice Law and Rules which was to replace the C.P.A., after the final Report of the
Advisory Committee was issued. They became sections 3031 through 3037 of the New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR). 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note
29, a t n 3031.01.
33 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t V3031.03 (citing Hammerstein v.
Woodlawn Cemetery, 21 Misc. 2d 42, 194 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1960)). See
L. REV.563 (1956) ("[Alll that is necessary is a simple
generally Legislation, 25 FORDHAM
statement, signed by the parties or their attorneys, specifying the claims and defenses
. and the relief requested.").
34 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t n3036.07. CPLR section 3036(5)
gives the court discretion to order whatever pretrial disclosure is necessary to promote a
speedy hearing. The SPCDD has a significant advantage over arbitration in this respect.
See In re Katz, 3 A.D.2d 238, 160 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1st Dep't 1957).
35 The right of parties to a trial by jury is waived when a controversy is submitted
pursuant to the SPCDD, except where the existence of a contractual provision authorizing use of the SPCDD is in question. See 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29,
a t ll 3034.03.
3s CPLR section 3035(b) renders inapplicable "the technical rules of evidence" to
the extent provided by CPLR section 3036. CPLR section 3036(1) provides that the rules
for the admissibility of evidence shall not apply to the taking of testimony or the adducing of proof in an action tried under the SPCDD. Exceptions to this rule should be
noted: (1) The court may order that rules of evidence be applicable; and (2) that the
usual rules with respect to privileged communications apply (i.e., CPLR sections 45014506). 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t 1 3036.02. The court may sua
sponte order expert testimony. N.Y. CIV.PRAC.L. & R § 3036(2) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
37 N.Y. CIV. PRAC.L. & R. § 3037 (McKinney 1974). See generally 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,Supra note 29, a t n 3037.01:
In order to prevent the subversion of the economies in time and expense effected by the Simplified Procedure, CPLR 3037 eliminates the right of appeal
from an intermediate order of the court except with the permission of the
court trying the action or the appellate court and, thus, supersedes CPLR

..
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normal appellate review of judicial findings of fact.38 Unlike
other informal methods of dispute resolution, substantive principles of New York law govern under the SPCDD.3s
Although the SPCDD is not often utilized,'O its potential for
alleviating crowded court dockets merits a critical review. Part I
of this Article discusses the history of the SPCDD and describes
its provisions. Part I1 compares the SPCDD with alternative
methods of dispute resolution in New York and Part I11 offers
suggestions as to why lawyers are reluctant to take advantage of
the simplified procedure. Part IV evaluates the ways in which
the SPCDD is particularly compatible with the IAS and suggests
methods for the SPCDD's full implementation.

I. THESPCDD: ITSHISTORY
AND PROVISIONS
The adoption of the SPCDD in 1956" represented a desire
on the part of the legislature to take a "fresh approach to dispute resolution by combining aspects of arbitration and formal
-

--

--

--

-

5701. A party may only appeal as of right from a judgment or an order that
determines whether a contract or submission was made or complied with. Review of the intermediate orders is preserved, however, and can be obtained on
appeal from the judgment.
Id. (citing N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 3 5501(a) (McKinney 1978) (scope of review from final
judgment)); Cohen v. Cohen, 3 N.Y.2d 339, 144 N.E.2d 355, 165 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1957).
38 N.Y. CIV. PRAC.
L. & R. $ 3037 (McKinney 1974) provides in pertinent part: "A
decision of the trial judge on the facts shall be final if there is any substantial evidence
to support it." Id.
The scope of review of the factual findings in an action tried under the SPCDD is
the same as the scope of judicial review of findings of fact by administrative bodies pursuant to CPLR section 7803(4). Under the latter provision, a court is limited in re-examining evidence to whether the factual findings of a body or officer are "supported by
substantial evidence." N.Y. Cm. PRAC.L. & R. $ 7803(4) (McKinney 1981). See also 8
WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t 1 7803.04. Generally, the appellate division is free to review questions of law and questions of fact. N.Y. CIV.PRAC.L. & R 3
5501(c) (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1988). The "standard on appeal is whether the judgment below was against the weight of the evidence (see CPLR 5522 and CPLR 5712): 3
WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t ll 3037.02. The substantive law of New
York governs on appeal. D. SIEGEL,supra note 29, $ 609, a t 876.
Ss See 0.CHASE,
supra note 29, a t 3 23.05; D. SIEGEL,supra note 29,s 609, a t 876; 3
WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t ll 3036.
'O D. SIEGEL,
supra note 29, 3 609, a t 876. See also notes 156-68 and accompanying
text infra.
" Ch. 219 [I9561 N.Y. Laws 249 (McKinney). For background on the SPCDD, see 3
WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t ll 3031.01. For a general description of
procedure, see 0. CHASE,CPLR MANUAL
$ 31.16 (1980); 0. CHASE,supra note 29, a t 3
23.05; Goldstein, supra note 15, a t 83-86, nn.49-62; D. SIEGEL,supra note 29, a t $ 609.
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litigation for use within the existing judicial ~ystem."'~The procedure applies to any justiciable controversy over which a court
has juri~diction.'~
The SPCDD is applicable where parties to an existing controversy agree to commence an action under the procedure," or
to continue an action without pleadings after a summons has
or where parties to a contract provide for its use
been ser~ed,'~
in future controver~ies.'~An action is commenced by filing a single clear and concise statement, signed by the parties, which sets
forth their claims, defenses, and the relief sought.'? Once the
4 2 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t ll 3031.01. The SPCDD was intended to be the beginning of a process that would take a new and imaginative view of
other aspects of New York procedure that were in need of simplification. Weinstein,
Trends in Civil Practice, 62 COLUM.
L. REV. 1431, 1434 (1962).
43 3 WEINSTEIN.
KORN& MILLER.supra note 29, a t 73031.02; see also FIFTH
ANNUAL
REPORT,
supra note 29, a t 103. See notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
N.Y. CIV.PRAC.L. & R. 3 3031 (McKinney 1974). An action under the SPCDD is
consensual in nature and cannot be commenced unilaterally. 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN&
MILLER,supra note 29, a t ll 3031.03. If the parties cannot agree on whether there was a
consent agreement, the party wishing to use the SPCDD must move to settle the term of
the statement in question. Id. (citing Perritano v. Town of Marnaroneck, 102 A.D.2d 854,
476 N.Y.S.2d 625 (2d Dep't 1984) (article 78 proceeding dismissed as inappropriate to
compel agreement to an SPCDD statement); Time Writers, Inc. v. Coleman, 67 Misc. 2d
258, 323 N.Y.S.2d 862 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga Cty. 1971) (motion for default judgment denied where plaintiff had attempted to commence action unilaterally by mailing a signed
statement to adversary).
N.Y. Crv. PRAC.L. & R. 3 3031 (McKinney 1974).
46 N.Y. CIV. PRAC.
L. & R. 3 3033(1) (McKinney 1974) (provides that parties may
enter into a contract to submit any existing or future controversy to the court for determination under the SPCDD). CPLR section 3033 does not specify any particular language that must be inserted in contracts. CPLR section 3031 suggests that a reference to
the "New York Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Disputes" is sufficient.
3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t ll 3033.01 (citing Mercury Coal & Coke,
Inc. v. Mannesmann Pipe and Steel Corp., 696 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1982) (preliminary
injunction against commencement of action under SPCDD should not have been granted
where contract contained provision for submission, which was prima facie valid, and no
showing was made either of grounds t o vitiate contract or of such serious inconvenience
that party would be deprived of opportunity to defend)). See also Copeland Planned
Futures, Inc. v. Obenchain, 9 Wash. App. 32,510 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1973) (where clause
providing "that any dispute arising out of this note shall be governed by the New York
Supreme Court in and for the County of Onondaga, pursuant to 'New York Simplified
Procedure for Determination of Disputes,' NYCPLR 3031-3037, with personal jurisdiction hereby consented to for that purpose, and New York law to govern," found valid,
and default judgment based on clause given full faith and credit by another state). See 3
WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t n 3033.01.
47 N.Y. Crv. PRAC.
L. & R. § 3031 (McKinney 1974). "By commencing the action in
this fashion, the parties consent to the application of the procedure set forth in CPLR
3034, CPLR 3035, and CPLR 3036 and waive their right to jury trial." 3 WEINSTEIN,
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statement is agreed to or settled by the ~ o u r t , ' it
~ is filed with
the court accompanied by a note of i~sue.'~Amended or supplemental statements may be served or filed a t any time during the
proceeding, within the court's d i s ~ r e t i o n . ~ ~
The SPCDD permits the court to hold a pre-trial conference
as a means of encouraging an expeditious disposition of the action on issues of law without resorting to a trial.61 The court has
discretion a t the pre-trial conference, or a t any other time during the proceeding, to: (I) order or allow service of an additional
or amended statement; (2) direct pre-trial disclosure and discovery; (3) permit the taking of depositions; (4) limit the number of
expert witnesses; (5) clarify and define the issues to be tried; (6)
stay or consolidate related actions; and (7) grant summary judgment.62 A default judgment can be entered if a party fails to
serve a statement within the time set by the court or fails to
appear after proper notice.6s By agreeing to have controversies
resolved pursuant to the SPCDD, the parties waive their right to
trial by
The statute provides, however, that if there is a
substantial question as to the existence or validity of a contract
provision to utilize the procedure, either party may demand a
jury trial on this issue.66 Should the jury conclude that a valid
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t ll 3031.03. Under some circumstances the statement
can be waived. See, e.g., Stell Mfg. Corp. v. Century Indus., 23 A.D.2d 281, 260 N.Y.S.2d
547 (1st Dep't), aff'd,16 N.Y.2d 1020,213 N.E.2d 313,265 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1965) (when no
objection made as to absence of required statement, service of statement deemed
waived).
If the parties have agreed contractually to submit a dispute to the court under the
SPCDD, yet cannot agree on the contents of the statement of claims and defenses,
CPLR section 3033(2) provides that either party can then move to have the court "settle" the terms of the statement. 3 WEINSTEIN.
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, at 1
3033.03.
'e N.Y. CIV. PRAC.L. & R. 3 3031 (McKinney 1974). See 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN&
MILLER,supra note 29, a t ll 3031.03 ("The signing of the statement constitutes a certificate that the issues are genuine and the filing of the statement and a note of issue acts as
a joinder of issues."); N.Y. CIV.PRAC.L. & R. 3 3036(b) (McKinney 1974) (describes requirements for filing of notice of issue); See 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note
29, at ll 3036.08.
50 N.Y. CIV. PRAC.
L. & R. 3 3032 (McKinney 1974). For a discussion of the court's
discretion to permit amendments under CPLR section 3032, see 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN&
MILLER,supra note 29, at ll 3032.02.
51 N.Y. CIV. PRAC.
L. & R. 3035(a) (McKinney 1974).
6z Id. at 3 3036(5).
I q d . a t 3 3036(4).
" Id. a t 3 3033(1).
55 Id. a t $3 3033(2), 3034(3).
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contract to adopt the SPCDD exists, "the jury must be discharged, and the controversy determined by the court as provided in section 3036."66 Should the jury conclude that there is
no valid contract between the parties to use the SPCDD, the
court must order the case to proceed as an ordinary action.67
The SPCDD permits the court to fashion a procedure to be
followed at trial to fit the particular circumstances of each case.
To expedite the hearing of an action, the court may follow a
simple and informal p r o ~ e d u r e The
. ~ ~ statute provides that the
court may dispense with the usual rules of evidence and procedure, and these rules shall not be used to exclude or restrict the
taking of testimony and adducing of proof.69 The court may,
however, exercise its discretion to apply the ordinary rules of eviden~e.~O
In addition, the court may direct the parties to obtain
the advice of an impartial expert if it determines that this advice would be material in deciding the action, and may direct
the parties to share in the payment of the expert's fees and ex-

'' 3 WEINSTEIN.
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t 1 3034.03.
Id. (citing Kores Mfg. Corp. v. Standard Packaging Corp., 31 A.D.2d 622, 295
N.Y.S.2d 862 (1st Dep't 1968) (plaintiffs motion to settle terms of statement denied
with leave to renew, if available, upon determination in a plenary action of question of
fraud in the inducement; order of lower court referring issues to referee and staying acREPORT,
tion by defendant for rescission and damages reversed)). See FIFTH ANNUAL
supra note 29, a t 98.
s8 CPLR section 3036 implements the authorization in CPLR section 3035 to provide a simplified procedure for SPCDD actions. The nine paragraphs of CPLR section
3036 provide only an outline of the practice that courts may follow. Courts may also
tailor the procedure to fit the particular facts of each case. 3 WEINSTEIN.
KORN& MILLER,
supra note 29, a t ll 3036.01.
Id. a t B 3036.02 ("Paragraph (1) of the CPLR 3036 provides that the rules for the
admissibility of evidence . .shall not apply . . .in an action tried under the Simplified
Procedure."). See aka id. a t 3 3035.03 ("Subdivision (b) renders inapplicable 'the technical rules of evidence' to the extent provided by paragraph (1)of CPLR 3036.").
There is an exception for privileged communications. N.Y. CIV. PRAC.L. & R. 3
3036(1) (McKinney 1974). See N.Y. Crv. PRAC.L. & R. 3 4501-4506 (McKinney 1963 &
Supp. 1988); FIFTHANNUAL
REPORT,supra note 29, a t 101 (The supporting study of the
Judicial Conference stated that "all the technical rules of evidence be dispensed with
except such fundamental rules as the statutory provisions relating to privileged communications!'). See generally 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t 3 3036.02
(discussing question of whether the CPLR section 4519 "Dead Man's Statute" is a rule
relating to privileged communication).
'O
N.Y. CIV.PRAC.L. & R 3 3036(1) (McKinney 1974). Professor Siege1 suggests that
permitting a judge to summarily curtail the applicability of the SPCDD rules may be one
of the reasons for the unpopularity of the SPCDD amongst the practicing bar. See note
165 and accompanying text infra.

.
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penses.%lThis does not prevent the parties from using their own
expert witnesses a t trial.'j2 The court also has the discretion to
award costs and disbursement^.^^ A judgment in an SPCDD action is entered and enforced pursuant to the regular provisions
of the CPLR.B4
Under the SPCDD, there is an appeal as of right only from
an order determining the issue of the existence or validity of the
contract to submit a controversy pursuant to the simplified
method, or from a final judgrnent.B6 An intermediate order may
be appealed only with leave of the trial or appellate court;86
however, review of an intermediate order is preserved and can
be obtained on appeal from the final j~dgment.~'The standard
for reviewing factual determinations under the SPCDD is
whether there was substantial evidence to support the finding.B8
N.Y. CN. PRAC.L. & R 3 3036(2) (McKinney 1974). See 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN&
MILLER,supra note 29, at 73036.03 ("In complicated or technical disputes, the availability of an impartial expert may assist in simplifying and expediting the trial.").
a2 3 WEINSTEIN.
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t ll 3036.03 ("CPLR 3036(5)(d)
gives the court the right to limit the number of experts to be heard a t trial, which presupposes that the parties have the right to use experts.").
CPLR section 3036(a) provides that "[c]osts and disbursements in an action
under the [SPCDD] are matters of judicial discretion and are not to be awarded as a
matter of course." N.Y. CIV. PRAC.L. & R. 3 3036(a) (McKinney 1974). 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t ll 3036.11. Presumably sanctions may be awarded
under CPLR section 8303. See Carlisle, supra note 1, a t 79-82.
" N.Y. CN. PRAC.L. & R. 3 3036(8) (McKinney 1974) See also 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN&
MILLER,supra note 29, a t l13035.02 (discussing some of the problems raised in determining the details of the procedure to be applied on matters specified in CPLR section
3036(8)).
e".Y.
CIV. PRAC.L. & R 3 3037 ( M c K i e y 1974).
es Id. "In order to prevent the subversion of the economies in time and expense
effected by the Simplified Procedure, CPLR 3037 eliminates the right of appeal from an
intermediate order of the court except with the permission of the court trying the action
or the appellate court and, thus supersedes CPLR 5701." 3 WEINSTEIN.
KORN& MILLER,
supra note 29, at IS 3037.01.
" 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t ll 3037.01 (citing N.Y. CIV.PRAC.
L. & R. f 5501(a) (McKinney 1978)) (scope of review from final judgment); Cohen v.
Cohen, 3 N.Y.2d 339, 144 N.E.2d 355, 165 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1957)).
N.Y. CN. PRAC.L. & R. 3 3037 (McKinney 1974) (decision of trial judge on facts
final if any substantial evidence exists to support it). Thus, the scope of appellate review
under the SPCDD is the same as judicial review of findings of fact by administrative
bodies under CPLR section 7803(4). 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t ll
3037.02. "In ordinary litigation the Appellate Division is free to review questions of law
and questions of fact. . . .The usual standard on appeal is whether the judgment below
was against the weight of the evidence . . and not whether 'there is any substantial
evidence to support it' as provided in this section." Id. See also D. SIEGEL,
supra note 29,
3 609, a t 876 ("The substantial evidence test of CPLR 7803(4) . . . has been borrowed by

.
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New York substantive law governs on appeal, as it does in all
phases of actions brought under the SPCDD.69
11. ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTERESOLUTION
DEVICES
AS CONTRASTED
TO THE

SPCCD

The formality that characterizes court proceedings has led
to disadvantages prompting some to conclude that courts are not
the best available forum for the resolution of disputes.?O Thus,
methods such as arbitration, private trials, negotiated settlements, mediation, neighborhood justice centers, and mini-trials
have been suggested as alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
devices.?'
Both the SPCDD and ADR systems reflect a dissatisfaction
with the judicial pro~ess,'~and are designed to dispense low cost
justice as quickly as possible. Both systems stress inf~rmality?~
by limiting or abolishing pretrial di~closure,'~motion practi~e,'~
trial by jury,?Band other technical requirements associated with

the Simplified Procedure for appellate review of the trial judge's fact findings.").
ss D. SIEGEL,
supra note 29, a t 876. Arbitration differs in this respect. For a discussion of the rules applicable to arbitration, see notes 81-98 and accompanying text infra.
See D. SIEGEL,supra note 29, a t 8 609; 0. CHASE,supra note 29, a t 8 23.05. See
generally 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t I1 3031.
See notes 15, 17-24 and accompanying text supra. See generally AMERICAN
BAR
ASSOC~ATION,
REPORTOF THE ACTIONCO~~MISSION
TO I~IPROVE
THE TORT
LIABILITY
SYSTEM
(Jan. 3, 1987) Appendix D (available in the files of the Brooklyn Law Review) [hereinafter ABA REPORT](describing various forms of alternative dispute resolution).
'' The imperfections of the judicial process most frequently noted as reasons
for movement away from the courts are: (1) crowded calendars and attendant
delay; (2) limitations on the scope of permissible evidence because of the exclusionary rules applied by the courts; (3) protracted trials; (4) unwanted publicity; (5) harassment of witnesses during cross examination; (6) lack of confidence in the ability of judges to determine . . . disputes; and (7) high cost of
counsel fees resulting from the length of the litigation process.
3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t l13031.01. See also Bellacosa, supra note
4.
See GOLDBERG,
GREEN& SANDER,
DISPUTERESOLUTION
189-91, 525-39 and references cited a t 538-39 (1985); Goldstein, supra note 15, a t 76-87.
?' ABA REPORT,
supra note 71.
Id.
7s Janofsky, Reducing Court Costs and Delay, 71 ILL. B.J. 94 (Oct. 1982) ("These
infamous twin evils - delay and cost - contribute to a climate of public cynicism and
mistrust of the legal profession, the judiciary, and our judicial system."). See also D.
SIECEL,supra note 29, a t 8 609; 0. CHASE,supra note 29, a t § 23.05. See generally 3
WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t ll 3036.
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l i t i g a t i ~ n .Despite
~~
these general similarities, however, significant differences remain between the SPCDD and ADR mechanisms. Unlike most ADR's, the SPCDD provides for: (1)resolution of disputes by a fact-finding judge whose decisions are
subject to appellate review;78 (2) the application of substantive
; ~ ~ (3) judicial
principles of New York law to the p r o ~ e e d i n g and
discretion to use other provisions of the CPLR to render speedy
justice with minimal cost to litigants.80
A. Arbitration
Arbitration is among the oldest and most commonly used of
the ADR methods?* Applicable rules, the selection of arbitrators, and the binding effect of the proceeding are generally decided by the parties pursuant to agreement.s2 Typically, each
side presents evidence and arguments to one or more arbitrators,
who then render a decision, usually called an "a~ard.'"~This
decision need not be based on any particular body of substantive
law?4 Agreements to arbitrate, as well as arbitral awards, are enforceable in the courts?5
In some cases, arbitration is required by statute or by rules
of court.86For example, in counties subject to the Chief Judge's
plan under Part 28 of the Rules of Court, claims of under $6000
must be submitted to arbitration?? Automobile insurance company claims for contribution against other insurance companies
D. SIEGEL,supra note 29, a t $5 586, 609.
78 N.Y. CIV. PRAC.L. & R. $ 3037 (McKiney 1974).
79 D. SIEGEL,
supra note 29, 5 609, a t 876.
3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t § 3036.01. See also Bellacosa,
supra note 4. See generally note 16 and accompanying text supra.
81 See JOHNSON.
KANTOR
& SCHWARTZ,
supra note 17, a t 39. See also Hoellering,
Alternative Dispute Resolution and International Trade, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE
785; note 17 supra.
82 Hoellering, supra note 81, a t 785-86.
83 See Goldstein, supra note 15, a t 76-80.
8' See 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t ll 3031.01.
Id. See also Goldstein, supra note 15, a t 76-77. See also 9 U.S.C. $ 4 (1982).
8s See N.Y. INS.LAW$$ 5105(b) and 5106(b) (McKinney 1985); N.Y. LABOR
LAW5
716(2) (McKinney 1977); N.Y. CIV. PRAC.L. & R. $5 3405, 7551, and 7556 (McKinney
Supp. 1988). See also note 15 supra; notes 87-90 and accompanying text infra.
N.Y. COMP.CODESR & REGS.tit. 22, 5 28.2(b) (1986); N.Y. CIV. PRAC.L. & R. 5
3405 (McKinney Supp. 1988) (authorizes the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals to
promulgate rules for the arbitration of money claims of $6000 or less).
77
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are also subject to mandatory arbitrati~n:~as are medical malpractice claims brought by members of health maintenance organizations against health care providers.s9 In addition, automobile insurance claimants can choose arbitration of their no-fault
claims.90
Despite the many advantages of arbitration, its deficiencies
have caused dissatisfaction in some quarters.91 "It is recognized
. . that the likelihood of a dispute being settled according to
generally recognized and predictable rules of substantive law
. . . is greater when the decision is made by a
This
determination results from the fact that often nonjudicial personnel are not sufficiently trained to hear and determine disp u t e ~ Moreover,
.~~
judicial review of decisions reached by arbitration is highly circumscribed, and courts frequently refuse to
Thus, there is a strong possibility that serienjoin arbitrati~n.~'
ous errors go u n c o r r e ~ t e d . ~ ~
Furthermore, in cases of claims under $6,000, or where automobile insurance claimants opt for arbitration, the parties are
. ~ ~same holds
afforded a full opportunity for trial de ~ o v o The
In such cases,
true if the arbitration is otherwise n~nbinding.~?
either side can choose to litigate the entire action in court after
the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings. This results in
substantial duplication of effort.
By contrast, the SPCDD provides for judicial decisions on
New York law that are subject to appellate review, yet made on
a less formal basis.9s There is no duplication of effort, and less
uncertainty about results. Moreover, errors of fact and law are
more likely to be corrected. Thus, the SPCDD retains many of

.

" N.Y. INS.LAW

5105(b) (McKinney 1985).
N.Y. CIV.PRAC.L. & R. $8 7551, 7556 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
N.Y. INS.LAW 5106(b) (McKinney 1985).
" See 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,
supra note 29, at ll 3031.01.
O2 Id.
O3 Id.
O4 Id.
Id.
O0 N.Y. CN. PRAC.
L. & R § 3405 (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.Y. COMP.CODESR. &
REGS.tit. 22, § 28.12 (1986) (claims under $6,000);N.Y. INS.LAW 5106(b) (McKinney
1985) (arbitration of no-fault claims at option of insured).
N.Y. CN. Pmc. L. & R § 3405 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
D. SIEGEL,
supra note 29, at § 609.
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arbitration's advantages, while avoiding its pitfalls.99

B. Administrative Proceedings
There is great emphasis today on resolving disputes by adCommentators agree, however, that
ministrative adjudicati~n.'~~
there are four basic problems with the administrative determination of disputes.lol
First, there is a conflict of interest problem. It is frequently
difficult to combine the investigating, litigating, rulemaking, and
adjudicating functions of an agency with the goals of assuring
fairness and impartiality to all parties.'02 The system of internal
separation of agency functions has always been viewed with
great suspicion by the private bar:'03
Many hearing officers and administrative law judges are employed by
the same agencies that promulgate the regulations that these officials
are supposed to be applying in an impartial manner. Unlike judicial
forums, agencies have tasks other than resolving judicial disputes.
Thus, agency determinations are influenced by the policies, aims, personalities, and sources of power sustaining the agency.lM

Second, administrative tribunals follow differing rules of
procedure.106 Also, it is frequently difficult to differentiate between rule-making and adjudicative determinations.'06 Although
both the state and federal administrative procedure acts were
designed to create uniform rules of procedure for administrative
bodies, uniformity has not occurred in actual practice.'07 The
federal act, passed in 1946,'08 has been altered indirectly by
changes in substantive law and in agency enabling acts.'09 The

loo

See 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN
& MILLER,
supra note 29, at ll 3031.
See Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 79, 111, 114, 118-19

(1976).

See Breger, supra note 18, at 338.
Id. at 352-53.
'03 Id. at 352.
l M Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the Apple: When Should the Doctrine of Issue
Preclusion Make an Administrative or Arbitral Determination Binding in a Court of
L. REV.63, 87-88 (1986).
Law?, 55 FORDHAM
lo" See Breger, supra note 18, at 344-45; Carlisle, supra note 104, at 85-87.
loB Carlisle, supra note 104, at 94 n.198.
Io7 See Breger, supra note 18, at 344-45.
Io8 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C.
'01

Io2

$3

551-559, 701-706 (1982)).
108

See Breger, supra note 18, at 343-45.
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state statute, which became effective in 1976,11° does not provide
consistent procedures for all administrative adjudication.lll For
example, the state statute is inapplicable to the State Insurance
Fund and the Workmen's Compensation Board,l12 two administrative agencies that have displaced court determination of
disputes.l13
A third problem is that neither the federal nor the state administrative procedure act guarantees litigants access to pretrial
dis~losure.~~'
Similarly, administrative tribunals are not bound
by the rules of evidence.l16
The fourth and final problem is that agencies that follow
formal adjudicative procedures to administer benefit, entitlement, and other compensation programs have experienced a vast
increase in ~aseloads."~Thus, it seems virtually impossible to
use the administrative process to resolve essentially private disputes without expanding an already vast bureaucratic structure.
These problems suggest that the substitution of administrative determinations for judicial decisions will only duplicate
functions that should be performed by courts, making today's
overloaded court system tomorrow's overworked administrative
agency.l17 Moreover, since most administrative proceedings are
subject to judicial review,lls the appellate process will remain
backlogged. Viewed in this light, the administrative process will
play a role in solving disputes involving the government and
other areas of substantial public interest, but not in the resolution of essentially private disputes.
Unlike administrative adjudication, the SPCDD works well
for private disputes. The SPCDD works within the court system,
rather than duplicating it, and streamlines the complex litiga-

I1O

Ch. 167 [I9751 N.Y. Laws 226 (McKinney).
N.Y. A.P.A. LAW 3 305 (McKinney 1984). See also Carlisle, supra note 104, at 95

n.198.
N.Y. A.P.A. LAW $ 102(1) (McKinney 1984).
Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 276 (1982).
Carlisle, supra note 104, at 86.
ll8 Id. at 87.
See Breger, supra note 18, at 353.
See Resnick, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL
L. REV. 603, 620 (1985). Resnick
reveals that, "[i]nvestigationsof agencies, such as the New York Human Rights Division
and the Social Security Administration, reveal inadequate processes, erratic decisionmaking, lack of resources, and administrative malfunctioning." Id.
118 N.Y. CIV.PRAC.L. & R 3s 7803, 7804 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1988).
112
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tion and trial processes that are the main cause of congestion
within our courts.119
C. Private Trials
One of the more innovative ADR techniques is the private
trial. This form of dispute resolution combines many of the aspects of a public trial with certain aspects of arbitration. As in
arbitration, parties to a private trial must agree on whether the
procedure will be binding.120 In most other respects, the private
trial is similar to a public trial, with a few important exceptions.
The private trial is conducted by nongovernmental entities,
and the proceedings are closed to the public unless the parties
agree to have them open.121 Decisions are made by retired judges
who apply principles of substantive law as they would in a public trial.122These decisions are appealable to a three judge appellate review ~ a n e 1 . lCertain
~~
procedural rules, such as those involving discovery, are the same as in a public trial.12( Simplified
rules of evidence allow for the presentation of witness testimony
in written documentary form, and the introduction of bills and
other financial documents without need for authentication or
identification. Motion practice is limited to purely essential
matters.126
The private trial mode of Alternative Dispute Resolution
has been severely criticized as highly duplicative of court proceedings, and, in effect, creating a private court system available
Its opponents
only to those with adequate financial
also fear that procedural guidelines will be ignored and, as a reMoreover, the
sult, fairness to litigants will be compr~mised.'~~
proceedings are usually closed, and thus not subject to public
See notes 78-80 and accompanying text supra (for a discussion of the merits of
the SPCDD).
lZ0 See Castro, supra note 23, at 64.
121 De Sando, supra note 23, at Al, col. 1.
lz2 Tolchin, supra note 23, at 38, cols. 1-4.
123 DeSando, supra note 23, at A2, col. 4.
Iz4 See JUDICATE,
INC.,JUDICATE
RULESOF PROCEDURE
(1984) (available in the files of
the Brooklyn Law Review). See also Tolchin, supra note 23.
lZ6 See JUDICATE
RULESOF PROCEDURE,
supra note 124 (Rule 13 states that "motion
practice shall be limited to those matters absolutely necessary to a final resolution of the
issues and not determined during the initial prehearing conference.").
lZ6 See Tolchin, supra note 23, at 38.
lZ7 Id.
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Technical problems in the private trial method of
dispute resolution include the lack of compulsory powers over
third parties,12Band, as with other ADR systems, the fact that
litigants must resort to public courts for enforcement of
decisions.130
The SPCDD has the advantages of the private trial without
sharing its problems. For example, the SPCDD eliminates burdensome and unnecessary disclosure and motion practice without depriving the litigants of third party practice or their right
of access to the courts.131

D. Summary Jury Trial
A summary jury trial is a nonbinding procedure in which
l ~ ~ jury's
both parties present arguments to a jury of 1 a ~ m e n .The
determination highlights the strong and weak points of each
party's case and thereby encourages settlement. No witnesses
testify; a summary of their testimony and all other evidence is
presented to the jury in the form of documents, depositions,
stipulations, and affidavits by the lawyers for each party. The
advantage of this method is that a summary jury trial can compress a long, protracted trial into a very short
This procedure, however, has numerous disadvantages. For
one, the procedure is nonbinding. Second, the procedure requires more preparation by counsel than is required for a conventional trial,13' which may actually frustrate ~ett1ement.l~~
A
third disadvantage is that the summary jury trial impedes the
jury's ability to make a decision based upon due deliberation, for
the jury is bombarded with voluminous amounts of information
in a very short period of tirne.l3=Fourth, a primary function per-

IZS

Id.

I t is, after all, a private court. See DeSando, supra note 23, a t Al, col. 1.
Id.
L.& R. 3 3031 (McKinney 1974). See also notes 70-80 and
See N.Y. CIV. PRAC.
accompanying text supra. See also note 261 infra.
Wilkinson, supra note 19, a t 1, cols. 3-4.
133 Id.
15' Id. a t 5, col. 1.
l3& Id.
136 Id. The jury may be overwhelmed especially where complex issues and many
parties are involved. In addition, "[ilf one believes that jurors' views evolve over time
during a full-scale trial of a complex case, then one must be dubious, a t best, about the
fundamental premise on which a [summary jury trial] is based, i.e., the notion that a
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formed by a jury is to evaluate the witnesses' testimony.13' The
elimination of this live testimony in favor of summary testimony
submitted by the attorneys defeats this primary role and tends
to underplay the role of witnesses and the facts of the case and
to overvalue the dramatics and theatrics of the 1 a ~ y e r s . l ~ ~
The summary jury trial procedure resembles the medical
malpractice panel, in which arguments by attorneys are
presented to a panel, consisting of a physician, a lawyer, and a
judge, which makes a nonbinding determination as to the liability of the defendant.139The panel's findings can be introduced
into evidence if the case goes to trial.140 In theory, it was believed that the medical malpractice panel procedure would encourage settlement and reduce the number of trials."' In practice, however, these panels have tended to hinder rather than
accelerate case disp~sition."~Thus, the summary jury trial is
likely to be a costly, time-consuming, and ineffective method of

passing splash of information can somehow be equated with a full length trial of difficult
issues." Id.
13'
See Hart, Shall the Jury System be Sacrificed on the Altar of Economy?, 27-28
N.Y. ST. B. BULL.146, 148 (1956).
138 See Wilkinson, supra note 19. In the average lengthy trial, the jury gradually
disregards the theatrics of lawyers and in exchange properly emphasizes the facts and
the witnesses. This is impossible in the summary jury trial. Id.
The summary jury trial procedures resembles the medical malpractice panel, another innovative technique used to avoid long, inefficient trials. Many of the disadvantages inherent in these panels are also found in the summary jury trial procedure.
In medical malpractice panels, attorney's arguments are presented to a panel consisting of a physician, a lawyer, and a judge. The panel makes a non-binding determination as to the liability of the defendant. See N.Y. JUD.
LAW$8 148-(a)(2) & 148-(a)@)
(McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1988). See also Sohn, Examination of Alternatives to Suit in
Doctor-Patient Disputes, 48 ALB. L. REV.669, 681 (1981). If the case proceeds to trial,
the panels' findings can be introduced in evidence. N.Y. JUD.
LAW8 148-(a)@) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1988). See also Sohn, supra, a t 683. If not, the panel determination is
used to expedite settlement by using the panel's recommendation as leverage in the negotiation. Because the summary jury trial closely resembles the medical malpractice
panel, it can be expected to share its problems.
140 N.Y. JUD.
LAW5 148-a(8) (McKinney 1983). See also Sohn, supra note 139.
141 Sohn, supra note 139, at 683-84.
1
4
'
Id. a t 684. The use of panels has slowed down the disposition of cases because
very often it results in two trials - one before the panel and one before the court. A trial
before a court is often demanded because "plaintiffs who have received a unanimous
panel recommendation have been notorious in demanding extremely high settlements
and in proceeding to trial with increased determination to carry the case to verdict or
costly settlement." Id. a t 684 (quoting N.Y. Times, Feb. 27,1983, 8 1, a t 40, col. 3). Thus,
the parties must bear the expenses of two trials instead of just one.
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dispute resolution as compared to the SPCDD.Iq3

E. Mini-Trials
The mini-trial is a mediation technique designed to bring
about a settlement between the parties. Both parties attend a
conference before an impartial third party, called an advisor."'
After hearing presentations from both sides, the advisor assists
the parties in formulating a voluntary settlement to the dispute.
The procedure is typically used in corporate and commercial
disputes, with executives from both sides present.lq6
The chief disadvantage of a mini-trial is that the settlement
reached is nonbinding.lq6The chief advantage, however, is that a
mini-trial is a very simple and informal procedure, only slightly
more cumbersome than an ordinary settlement conference.lq7
Thus, the procedure would be highly compatible with the
SPCDD, particularly under the US system.148For example, the
court could first refer the parties to a neutral advisor for a minitrial, or could structure settlement conferences to incorporate
features of the mini-trials, thereby making the mini-trial a viable part of the SPCDD process rather than just another nonbinding ADR technique.

F . Community Dispute Resolution Centers
The Community Dispute Resolution system is an innovative
and popular mediation technique. This system is a voluntary
process whereby both parties meet with a neutral mediator, and
together attempt to fashion an acceptable resolution for their
disp~te."~Most of the disputes handled by the centers are re-

''=N.Y.CIV.PRAC.L. & R $$ 3033, 3036(8) (McKinney 1974).
See Dalton, supra note 20, a t 7, col. 1.
Id.
See Burger, supra note 113, a t 277. Chief Justice Burger suggests that when nonbinding procedures are used, sanctions should be imposed to discourage litigants from
taking the case further without sanctions, non-binding mediation techniques tend to be
ineffective. Id.
14' See Dalton, supra note 20, a t 7, col. 1.
See test accompanying notes 243-51 infra.
14@ See Christian, supra note 24, a t 772. The Community Dispute Resolution Centers Program (CDRCP) was created in 1981 under the direction of the Office of Court
Administration of the Unified Court System of the State of New York. Id. (citing N.Y.
JUD. LAW8 849-b (McKinney Supp. 1988)).
14'
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ferred by courts and public agencies.lS0The disputes customarily
involve minor civil, criminal, and family matters that do not
Examples include small claims, conneed formal adjudicati~n.'~~
sumer-merchant disputes, simple assault, and certain domestic
violence matters.lS2While these centers perform a valuable social service, they are designed to handle a small and very specific
class of disputes that typically do not end up in full-blown litigation. Thus, the existence of these centers is not likely to alleviate court congestion. By contrast, the SPCDD is designed to resolve disputes that require formal adjudication.

G. Trial by Referee
Article 43 of the CPLR permits a judge to refer a case for
trial before a referee.lS3The referee decides only those matters
the court instructs him to decide, in their order of reference.15'
The court can limit the referee's power by limiting the order of
reference. This greatly limits the utility of trial by referee as an
ADR technique, as some matters will likely be tried to the referee, while others will be tried by the court or jury. This also creates the potential for duplication of judicial effort. Moreover,
under ordinary circumstances, the cost of the referee must be
borne by the parties, thus adding cost to the dispute resolution
p r o ~ e ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~
A trial by referee with a sufEciently broad order of reference, however, would be highly compatible with the SPCDD,
and would conserve judicial resources. For example, simple actions under the SPCDD could be tried by a referee, while more
complex cases could be tried by a judge. Similarly, a- trial by
referee could be used to narrow the issues to be tried by the
judge in the SPCDD action, also reducing court time.
Id. at 772.
Id. at 771.
Is2 See generally id.
Is3 N.Y. CIV.PRAC.
L. & R. $3 4301-4321 (McKinney 1963).
Is4 N.Y. CIV. PRAC.
L. & R. 3 4311 (McKinney 1963). See also L.H. Feder Corp. v.
Bozkurtian, 48 A.D.2d 701, 368 N.Y.S.2d 247 (2d Dep't 1975) (referee may not decide
issues not before him in the order of reference).
m5 N.Y. CIV.PRAC.
L. & R. 3 4321 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1988). The only exception is when the referee is a judicial hearing officer. In that case, his compensation is
determined pursuant to the Judiciary Law. See N.Y. JUD.Law 852 (McKinney Supp.
1988).
Is0
Is'
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111. WHYLAWYERS
HAVE
NOTUSEDTHE SPCDD
In view of the high volume of cases filed in the trial courts
of the Unified Court System of New Y ~ r k , it
' ~would
~
appear
that the SPCDD is underutilized. For example, almost onethird, or 1,021,218, of the cases filed in New York in 1987 were
in civil
The number of civil cases disposed of in 1987
totaled 952,354.168 Included in these dispositions were 12,220
civil-case trials brought in the supreme court. Of this number,
56% were tried by a judge.169 Similarly, although thirty-one
counties operate a mandatory arbitration program for cases involving claimed damages of $6,000 or less, only 12,473 cases were
received for arbitration in 1987.1e0 Of the cases disposed of in
the arbitration program, there were 1,607 demands for trial de
nouo.lel Cases received under the Community Dispute Resolution Centers Program in 1987 totaled 101,851, but only 19,801 of
these cases were disposed of.le2 These statistics, and the sparse
case law generated under the SPCDD, indicate a general reluctance by the bar to take advantage of New York's simplified
procedure.le3
Many reasons exist for the underutilization of the SPCDD.
Obviously, some members of the bar are not aware of its existence,le4while others are wary of the judge's discretionary powers under the SPCDD.le6 Also, lawyers generally dislike surrenIs8 During 1987, there were 3,581,911 filings in the trial courts of the Unified Court
System, including 886,614 parking tickets. Of the 2,695,297 remaining cases, 41%
(1,113,752) were filed in criminal courts, 38% (1,021,218) in civil courts, 16% (439,130) in
the Family Courts and 5% (121,197) in the Surrogates' Courts. CHIEFADMINISTRATOR'S
REPORT.supra note 5, a t 2-1.
Is'
Tort actions, including medical malpractice, accounted for 58% of the civil filings
in the supreme court. Id. a t 2-11. Statewide 180,110 new civil cases were filed in the
supreme court. Id. a t 2-10. In the Civil Court of the City of New York there were 252,475
civil action summonses filed in 1987. Id. a t 2-15. For landlordltenant calendars, 336,191
notices of petition were issued in summary proceedings. Id. The remainder of civil cases
were filed in city and district courts outside New York City and in county courts and the
court of claims. Id. a t 2-2.
lss Id.
Id. a t 2-11.
lea Id. at 2-16.
Id.
16* Id. a t 2-26.
Ie3 See D. SIEGEL,
supra note 29, 5 609, a t 874.
Is'
Id.
leS Id. Professor Siege1 suggests that one of the factors accountable for the unpopuof procelarity of the SPCDD is that CPLR section 3036(1) states that the "rules

.. .
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dering their right to pre-trial disclosure166and to trial by jury.167
Finally, some decisional law has been interpreted to suggest that
the SPCDD is not applicable to tort actions.16* Each of these
impediments to the expanded use of the SPCDD is worthy of
analysis.
A. Pretrial Disclosure
The benefits of pretrial disclosure under Article 31 of the
CPLRle9 are well known; it encourages settlements and usually
improves the efficiency of a trial or hearing and the quality of a
court decision.170 Yet extensive disclosure is not necessary for
most civil cases.171 The high cost of discovery and discovery
abuses with their attendant delay have prompted great concern
among the bar, the judiciary, and the 1egi~lature.l~~
CPLR 3126, and the recently amended CPLR 8303-a, were
dure shall be dispensed with," but adds, "unless the court shall otherwise direct." Id.
(citing N.Y. CIV. PRAC.L. & R. 3 3036(1) (McKinney 1974)). However, another distinguished commentator argues that this section is beneficial to the purposes of the SPCDD
because it permits the trial judge to maintain control over the procedure. See Goldstein,
supra note 15, a t 85 n.58 (citing De Benedictis Rules Restricting Civil Procedures Takes
Effect Friday, L.A. Daily J., June 27,1983, a t 1, col. 6). See also notes 212-15 and accompanying text infra.
lee See notes 169-81 and accompanying text infra.
Iu7 See notes 182-92 and accompanying text infra.
lg8 See N.Y. Kandy Kard Corp. v. Bartons Candy Corp., 32 A.D.2d
513, 298
N.Y.S.2d 562 (1st Dep't 1969); notes 200-04 and accompanying text infra. See also 3
WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t ll 3033.01. Provisions requiring submission
of disputes under the SPCDD have also been utilized in separation agreements, see, e.g.,
Hunter v. Hunter, 57 A.D.2d 797,394 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1st Dep't 1977); Kleiner v. Sanjenis,
46 A.D.2d 617,359 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1st Dep't 1974); Goldenberg v. Goldenberg, 25 A.D.2d
670, 268 N.Y.S.2d 383 (2d Dep't 1966), as well as various types of community contracts,
e.g., Castagna & Son Inc. v. Alan Michel Plumbing, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 841,462 N.E.2d 139,
473 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1984) (construction contract); Hurlbut v. Christiano, 63 A.D.2d 1116,
405 N.Y.S.2d 871 (4th Dep't 1978) (contract to purchase a nursing home); Freund v.
Washington Square Press, Inc., 41 A.D.2d 371, 343 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1st Dep't 19731, rev'd
on other grounds, 34 N.Y.2d 379, 357 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1974) (contract to publish a book).
See also supra note 30.
IBs N.Y. CIV. PRAC.L. & R $3 3101-40 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1988).
See 0. CHASE,supra note 41, a t 3 20.01; see generally D. SIEGEL,supra note 29,
at 3 343.
17' See Green, Marks & Olsen, supra note 16, a t 501-11; see also Note, California's
Pilot Project in Economical Litigation, 53 So. CAL.L. REV.1497, 1502 & n.98 (1980).
See D. SIEGEL,supra note 29, 3 367, a t 465. "The present system . . . is too
tolerant of the deliberately evasive and dilatory litigant, increasing the expense of litigation in money, time, trouble, and feeling, and, consequently, helping to undermine public
confidence in the courts." Id.
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enacted to minimize abusive pre-trial practice^.'^^ Similarly, the
New York Uniform Rules of the Court174which govern the new
Individual Assignment System176were designed, in part, to require judges to exercise more supervisory control over discove r ~ . Consequently,
'~~
many of the tactical advantages and litigation strategies long associated with pretrial disclosure no longer
apply and thus should no longer dissuade lawyers from using the
SPCDD. Also, under the SPCDD, a judge can order whatever
disclosure he deems necessary.177
In addition, the SPCDD assures that attorneys' fees and
discovery costs will not prohibit plaintiffs from making use of
N.Y. CIV. PRAC.
L. & R. $ 3126 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1988). This provision
states in pertinent part:
If any party, or a person who a t the time a deposition is taken or an examination or inspection is made, . . . refuses to obey an order for disclosure or
wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been
disclosed, . . . the court may make such orders with regard to the failure or
refusal as are just . . . .
Id.
See also N.Y. CIV.PRAC.
L. & R. 3 8303-a (McKinney Supp. 1988), as enacted by Ch.
220, 35, [I9861 N.Y. Laws 386 (McKinney). For a discussion of the new law, see Carlisle, supra note l, a t 67.
17'
The New York Uniform Rules incorporate the individual assignment system. Effective 1986, these rules are codified in various sections of title 22 of the New York Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations, N.Y. COMP.CODESR. & REGS.,tit. 22 $ 202
(1986). See also Fox, Comment on McLoughlin v. Henke, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 19, 1986, a t 1,
col. 3.
See The Individual Assignment System, supra note 1 (describing the IAS system in the county and supreme courts); The Uniform Rules Take Effect, Part 11: Papers
and hfotion Practice, 313 N.Y. ST. L. DIG. 1, 1-3 (Jan. 1986) (describing how to file papers in court and how motion practice is accomplished under the IAS system); The Uniform Rules Take Effect, Part 111: The Preliminary Conference, 314 N.Y. ST. L. DIG. 1, 13 (Feb. 1986) [hereinafter The Preliminary Conference] (describing the required preliminary conference under the IAS system); The Uniform Rules Take Effect, Part IV: A
Brief Overview and a Few Observations, 315 N.Y. ST. L. DIG. 1 , l - 3 (Mar. 1986) (describing in detail a number of rules under the IAS system). See also notes 237-50 and accompanying text infra. See generally Brodsky, supra note 1, a t 288-90 (how motion practice
is changed under the IAS system).
176 See Uniform Rule 202.12(g), which states in material part:
In the discretion of the court, failure of a party to comply with the order or
transcript resulting from the preliminary conference, or the making of unnecessary or frivolous motions by a party, shall result in the imposition upon such
party of costs or such other sanctions as are authorized by law.
COMP.CODESR. & REGS.tit. 22 $ 202.12(g) (1986). See also Lawyer in Case under IAS
Penalized for Delay of Trial, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 19, 1986, a t 1, col. 3 (lawyer penalized by
judge for failure to comply with the "new rules of the game" under individual assignment system).
See N.Y. CIV.PRAC.
L. & R. $ 3036(1) (McKinney 1979). See also note 165 supra.

Heinonline - - 54 Brook. L. Rev.

119 1988-1989

120

BROOKLYN L A W REVIEW

[Vol. 54: 95

the courts.1TsSimilarly, the SPCDD guarantees defendants that
disclosure will not be utilized to extract substantial settlements
by forcing them to consent to a disposition solely to avoid years
of litigation.lT9Under the SPCDD, disputes can be resolved with
or without disclosure, depending upon the type of case and the
necessity to formulate issues for trial by a judge.lS0Furthermore,
the SPCDD is particularly useful under the new Individual Assignment System where one judge handles a case from beginning
to end.lsl

B. Trial By Judge
Approximately fifty-six percent of all civil supreme court
trials in New York are nonjury trials.lS2 This reflects a longstanding realization by the bar that experienced fact-finding
judges often render better decisions than juries.lss The principal
function of a jury is to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and
attempt to reach a decision based on which witnesses the jury
believes are telling the truth. The jury then renders its verdict in
accordance with instructions from the court. Neither the jury, in
rendering its verdict, nor a judge, when rendering a decision in a
bench trial, pretends to know what actually happened a t the
time of the incident upon which the cause of action is predicated. An experienced judge, however, can resolve most disputed
17$ See Loggins, How the Plaintiff's Counsel Views ELP, 20 JUDGES
J. 11 (1981).
The SPCDD in New York closely resembles the simplified procedure enacted by the
California courts. The Economical Litigation Program (ELP) has demonstrated that
minimizing pleadings and discovery reduces the time an attorney spends on each individual case, thereby reducing attorney costs. Id. Similarly, CPLR section 3031 limits
pleadings, and CPLR section 3036(5) limits disclosure. Thus, New York can expect the
positive results experienced by the California courts. N.Y. CIV. PMC. L. & R. $is 3031,
3036(5) (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1988). See also notes 251-55 and accompanying text
infra.
Disclosure is limited by the judge, thus defendant's interests are protected from
discovery abuses by plaintiff. See N.Y. CN. PRAC.L. & R. $ 3036(5).
See note 177 and accompanying text supra.
18'
See notes 237-50 and accompanying text infra.
REPORT,supra note 5, a t 2-11.
See CHIEFADMINISTRATOR'S
lS3 See generally 8. BOTEIN,
TRIALJUDGE
1, 142 (1952 & reprint 1974) (two distinguished jurists recognize that overall there is no reason to believe that determinations
made by judges would be any different from those made by juries); Foster, Jury Trial on
Trial - A Symposium, 28 N.Y. ST. B. BULL.322 (Oct. 1956); Peck, Report on Justice, 25
N.Y. ST. B. BULL.107, 116-18 (Apr. 1953).
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issues of fact as well as a jury.lB4 Also, under the SPCDD, a
judge is permitted to seek the assistance of an impartial courtappointed expert to aid in the analysis of unusual facts.lB5
Proponents of trial by jury agree that having a jury in the
offing serves three purposes: (1)as a threat of an immediate jury
trial against a plaintiff who wants too much, or against a defendant who won't pay enough, or perhaps against both;ls6 (2) for
counsel who has a poor case but believes he can persuade a jury
to decide for his client;lB7and (3) assuming liability is established against the defendant, a jury is more likely to award the
plaintiff a larger monetary amount than a judge.lBs These arguments in favor of trial by jury have not been embraced by the
plaintiffs' or defendants' bar in jurisdictions where simplified
procedures similar to the SPCDD are used.ls9 These arguments
are of even less concern to the plaintiffs' bar under the new IAS
because one judge has a case from beginning to end.lgOOnce a
request for judicial intervention is filedlgl and the case is assigned to a particular judge, both parties will be in a position to
weigh the potential benefits of a trial by jury against the advanSee Peck, supra note 183, a t 117.
See N.Y. CIV. Pruc. L. & R. 3 3036(2) (McKinney 1974); 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN&
MILLER,supra note 29, a t ll 3036.03. See also note 61 and accompanying text supra.
"s Foster, supra note 183, a t 323.
'SI
Id.
Is8 See generally, Glaser, Damages Update - 1986, 18 TRIAL
L.Q. 16 (1987).
Is* See Loggins, supra note 178, a t 11; see also Mercy, How the Defense Counsel
Vieurs ELP, 20 JUDGES
J. 12 (1981) (overall, they have been pleased with the results of
simplified procedures). In these jurisdictions using simplified procedures, attorneys have
found that non-productive court time is avoided by placing limits on discovery and the
disallowance of demurrers to complaints. In addition, because recovery amounts are limited, plaintiffs are not likely to make excessive payment demands on defendants. Further, the work required to prepare a case under the simplified procedure is considerably
less than that required for a full trial. Id.
See notes 230-45 and accompanying text infra.
I@' A Request for Judicial Intervention (RJI) is governed by Rule 202.6 of the Uniform Rules. Rule 202.6 requires that if a judge has not already been assigned to the case,
an RJI must accompany any of the following: (1) a notice of motion; (2) an order to show
cause; (3) an application for an ex parte order; (4) a notice of petition; (5) a note of issue;
(6) a notice of medical or dental malpractice; (7) a statement of net worth as required by
Domestic Relations Law section 236 for matrimonial actions; or (8) a request for the
assignment of an action to a judge and a preliminary conference. The filing of the RJI
gets the case assigned to a judge who supervises the case thereafter until the termination
of the case. See N.Y. COMP.CODESR. & REGS.tit. 22, § 202.3(b) (1986). See generally
The Individual Assignment System, supra note 1.
Is'

lss
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tages of the SPCDD.lS2Hence, judicial familiarity with the facts
and issues of a particular type of case, and the judge's ability to
give issues measured consideration, may be more readily accomplished under the SPCDD. The third objection to the SPCDD,
that juries render larger damage awards than judges, lacks merit
because most cases under the SPCDD will have a value of less
than $100,000.1s3In any event, run-away jury damage awards are
usually reduced by appellate courts.1s4In light of the advantages
of a trial by judge, the lawyers' hesitancy to utilize SPCDD is
misplaced.

C. Tort Cases
The majority of the civil cases filed in New York State
courts are tort actions,lS6yet there is a widespread misunderstanding by the trial bar that the SPCDD cannot be used for
these cases.lg6This misunderstanding stems from the bar's general unfamiliarity with the SPCDD, as well as case law suggesting that the SPCDD cannot be used for tort claims.197The
sole case addressing the applicability of the SPCDD to tort
claims is New York Kandy Kurd Corp. v. Barton's Candy
C ~ r p . 'where,
~ ~ shortly after the adoption of the CPLR,'ee the
lgZ See 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t 11 3031. Both parties must
consent to the use of SPCDD. One party cannot unilaterally decide to submit the case to
the court under SPCDD. Id. a t ll 3031.03. Under the former Master Calendar System it
was difficult, if not impossible, to know which judge would be assigned to a case under
the SPCDD. Similarly, once the case was assigned to a judge, it was not clear if it would
remain with this judge through trial or be reassigned. See also notes 230-36 and accompanying text infra.
lg3 See Foster, supra note 183, a t 326 (juries do not necessarily render larger damage awards than judges).
la'
See, e.g., Vialva v. New York, 118 A.D.2d 710,499 N.Y.S.2d 977 (2d Dep't 1986)
(verdict of $400,000 for conscious pain and suffering reduced to $100,000); Jandt v.
Abele, 116 A.D.2d 699,498 N.Y.S.2d 17 (2d Dep't 1986) ($100,000 jury verdict reduced to
$65,000); Korman v. Pub. Serv. Truck Renting, Inc., 116 A.D.2d 631, 497 N.Y.S.2d 480
(2d Dep't 1986) ($1,500,000 jury verdict reduced to $200,000); Morales v. New York, 115
A.D.2d 439, 497 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1st Dep't 1985) ($425,000 jury verdict for wrongful death
and conscious pain and suffering reduced to $200,000).
lgS See CHIEFADMINISTRATOR'S
REPORT,supra note 5, a t 2-11 (tort actions accounted for 58% of the civil cases filed in 1987).
lg6 See note 168 and accompanying text supra.
lg7 See notes 156-68 and accompanying text supra.
lg8 32 A.D.2d 513, 298 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1st Dep't 1969).
lgs The CPLR was adopted in 1962 and became effective September 1, 1963. Ch.
308, [I9621 N.Y. Laws 593 (McKinney). These laws repealed and replaced the Civil Prac-
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Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department held that
issues soundjng in tort did not come under the clause of a contract agreed to by the parties, providing for the use of simplified
procedure.200
Kandy Kard involved a contract between two parties that
provided for the use of the SPCDD "as to any controversy arising thereunder."201 An action arose sounding both in tort and
breach of contract. The appellate division did not permit the issues to be disposed of pursuant to the SPCDD, holding that the
parties did not intend the issue involving tort law to be decided
under the contractual clause providing for the simplified proceThe appellate division based its decision on its observation that "it would be wasteful, inefficient, and, indeed a complicated rather than a simple procedure to try [the tort] issue alone
and resort to simplified procedures for the issue of breach of
contract."203Consequently, both the tort and breach of contract
issues were disposed of pursuant to full litigation procedure^.^^
The Kandy Kard decision, which has not been interpreted
or applied by any other New York court,205should be limited to
its particular facts. A review of the legislative history reveals
that there is no question that the legislature intended the
SPCDD to apply to tort cases.208The SPCDD would be particularly useful in automobile accident cases, which comprise a significant number of the total civil cases filed each year,207 for
many of these cases require little pre-trial disclosure. Also, a
judge could conduct the trial faster than, and as fairly as, a
tice Act and Rules of Civil Practice. See note 32 supra.
Kandy Kard, 32 A.D.2d a t 514, 258 N.Y.S.2d a t 564. See also N.Y. CIV. PRAC.
L.
& R. $3 3031-3037 (McKinney 1974).
Kandy Kard, 32 A.D.2d a t 514, 258 N.Y.S.2d a t 564.
loZ Id.
=03 Id.
Id.
l o 6 See 3 \VEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t ll 3036.
?OB See FIFTHANNUAL
REPORT,supra note 29, a t 103 ("There is no reason why this
procedure [SPCDD] should not be available to any parties who feel they would like to
use it, in any type case, even in negligence actions."); see also D. SIEGEL,supra note 29, $
609, at 876 (1978) ("[The SPCDD] is apparently available for any subject matter, including tort. . . ." [citation omitted]); 0. CHASE,supra note 29, $ 230.05, a t 904 ("Any justiciable controversy, regardless of subject matter, may be submitted to the court under the
Simplified Procedure, but only if both sides agree.").
' 0 7 King, Constitutionality of No Fault Jurisprudence, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 797
(1983).
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jury.208 The time saved by not impaneling a jury and by bypassing technical rules of evidence, bench conferences, and jury
summations and instructions would cut a significant amount of
trial time.20BSimilarly, under the SPCDD, the prospects of an
immediate trial would generate settlements in these negligence
cases at an earlier date with less cost to the parties and to the
court system.210

D. Judicial Discretion
CPLR section 3036(1) of the SPCDD states that the rules of
procedure "shall be dispensed with" but then adds, "unless the
court shall otherwise direct."211 This section thereby permits a
judge, without explanation, "to cancel out summarily the sole
Professor David
advantage of the Simplified Pr~cedure."~'~
Siege1 suggests that "the very existence of this power may be
one of the factors accountable for the unpopularity of the Simplified P r o ~ e d u r e . "He
~ ~argues,
~
in effect, that there is no guarantee that parties stipulating to use of the SPCDD can rely on
its use.214 Other commentators believe that CPLR 3036(1)
merely gives a judge the flexibility to assure that the legislative
intent of the SPCDD is implemented, while permitting resort to
the normal rules of procedure in cases where it would be
helpful.216
Professor Siegel's concern may be applicable to matters that.
could otherwise be submitted to arbitration,21e because if two
parties agree to present an arbitral matter to the SPCDD, they
do not want a judge to change their intent. Professor Siegel's
See notes 183-93 accompanying text supra.
See Epstein, Reducing Litigation Costs for Small Cases, 20 JUDGESJ. 9, 65
(1981). See also A B A REPORT,
supra note 7 1 (section G and Appendix C relating t o
Maricopa County, Arizona Fast Track System).
*lo See Epstein, supra note 209, at 66. In his evaluation o f California's project for
economical litigation, Epstein comments that "there is nothing more conducive t o a settlement than the certainty that i f there is no settlement, there will be trial within a short
and specified number o f days." Id.
211 N.Y.CIV. PRAC.
L. & R. 8 3036(1) (McKinney 1974). See generally notes 58-64
and accompanying text supra.
212 See D. SIEGEL,
supra note 29, § 609, at 875.
21s Id. See a k o note 107 and accompanying text supra.
214 D. SIEGEL,
supra note 29, 3 609, at 875.
21"oldstein, supra note 165, at 85 n.58.
'18 D. SIEGEL,
supra note 29, 3 609, at 876.
208
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concern, however, is less meritorious in tort cases. As many tort
claims must be tried in courts that have jurisdiction to grant
monetary relief in excess of $25,000,217 there are few forums
available other than the SPCDD. Hence, the parties' expectations will not be disappointed if a judge uses the discretion and
power granted him under the statute to employ normal court
rules, while still making a decision pursuant to simplified procedure. In addition, under the U S , judges have already established their own court rules, of which the parties will be aware
prior to any agreement to submit a controversy to the court
under the SPCDD.218These rules lessen the likelihood that a
judge will arbitrarily frustrate the parties' expectations of the
procedure to be followed under the SPCDD.

IV. COMPATIBILITY
OF SPCDD WITH THE US SUGGESTIONS
FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE SIMPLIFIED
PROCEDURE
There is little doubt that the excessive cost of litigation in
New York219and the high volume of civil cases swamping our
state
often make judicial decisionmaking cumbersome
Judges and juries are
and inaccessible to many ~laimants.2~~
0verworked.2~~
In 1987 eighteen percent of all civil cases were
not disposed of within the fifteen month period disposition stana'7 The supreme court is the court of general jurisdiction in New York. N.Y. JUD.
LAW§ 140-b (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1988). County courts and district courts, and the
New York City Civil Court can hear claims up to $25,000. N.Y. JUD.
LAW 190 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. CITYCIV. CT. ACT $3 201, 213 (McKinney 1963 & Supp.
1988). The New York City Civil Court can hear claims up to $15,000. N.Y. UNIFORM
DIST.
CT. ACT S S 201-13 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1988).
2'8 Under the IAS each judge issues "information sheets" with his or her own rules.
See Carlisle, supra note 1, a t 85.
See Burger, supra note 16, a t 296. Chief Justice Burger points out that the cost
of lawyers fees to litigants has increased faster than the inflated cost of living. In addition, abuse of the pretrial process adds to the high cost of litigation. Id.
See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
22' Cooke, supra note 15, a t 612 n.4. See also Bell, Crisis in the Courts: Proposals
for Change, 31 VAND.L. REV.2, 8 (1978).
222 E. JOHNSON.
JR, PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIS
OF ALTERNATIVESTRATEGIES
FOR PROCESSING CIVILDISPUTES
2 (1978); Belli, The Law's Delays: Reforming Unnecessary Delay in
Civil Litigation, 8 J. LEGIS.16 (1981) (If congestion in the courts is not diminished, the
judicial system may deteriorate to the point where "laymen will be tempted to circumvent the legal process entirely."); Cooke, supra note 15, a t 612 ("The conventional forum
for dispute resolution, the court, has become a beleaguered institution."). See also CHIEF
ADLIINISTRATOR'S
REPORT,supra note 5, a t 2-1 (New York state courts disposed of
3,527,362 cases in 1987).
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dard mandated by the Office of Court Administratio11.2~~The
Governor's Advisory Committee on Liability Insurance deems
the tort crisis in New York serious enough to have recommended
that the legislature amend the current statutory authorization of
mandatory court-annexed arbitration of tort cases by raising the
limit on case value from $6,000 to $25,000.224Similarly, the Unified Court System in the state of New York has recently announced a five point plan to aggressively expand ADR use in
. ~ ~
means
~ that many cases that should be heard
New Y ~ r kThis
~ ~ citzens can
by judges will be shifted to ADR f o r ~ r n s , 2where
resolve their own cases.
The SPCDD represents a solution to our state court litigaThe procedure is well suited for resolving disputes
tion
where the actual amount in controversy is between $25,000 and
$100,000.228Full utilization of the SPCDD will enable litigants
to obtain judicial decisions more economically, both in terms of
time and litigation costs. It will also relieve crowded court dockets and permit judges and juries to devote more time to complex
cases that require full-blown litigation. Similarly, use of the
SPCDD will permit judges to more fully exercise their supervisory powers under the
A. IAS and SPCDD
For many years New York courts used the Master Calendar
S y ~ t e m . 2Under
~ ~ this system, cases were before the court but
not before any particular j~dge.2~'Motions were filed before
"terms" and whichever judge was assigned to the term disposed
of the motion. If numerous motions were filed in a dispute, as
was often the case, many different judges had to become familiar
See CHIEFADMINISTRATOR'S
REPORT,supra note 5, a t 2-4, 2-8, 2-11, 2-16.
See GOVERNOR'S
ADVISORY
COMM'N
ON LIABILITY
INSURANCE,
INSURING
YOURFUTURE 178 (1986) [hereinafter JONES
111.
226 See Bellacosa, supra note 4, a t 34, col. 6.
228 Id.
227 See notes 157-68 and accompanying text supra. See generally Jones 11, a t 58-70
(describing tort litigation crisis that exists in New York). See generally Tort Crisis Report, A.B.A. J., Jan. 11, 1987, a t 1-7 (describing general tort crisis in United States).
228 See 3 WEINSTEIN,
KORN& MILLER,supra note 29, a t ll 3033.
229 See 22 N.Y.C.R.R.
202.3(a) (a single judge has continuous supervision over a single case). See also REPORT
TO THE CHIEFJUDGE,
supra note 5, a t 1, 6-15.
230 See The Individual Assignment System, supra note 1, a t 1-2.
231 Id.
223
224
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with the facts underlying the d i ~ p u t e . 2Then,
~ ~ if the case went
on to trial, another judge would try
The Master Calendar System made it difficult, if not impossible, to utilize the SPCDD. With managerial responsibility for a
case resting in many hands, simplified procedures under the
Moreover, litiSPCDD could not be uniformly im~lemented.2~'
gation under the SPCDD, which contemplated judicial supervision by one judge, was not easily harmonized with a system that
de-emphasized individual judicial accountability for control and
~~
the SPCDD, as a means
disposition of d i s p ~ t e s . 2Consequently,
of resolving disputes, "languished a t the very brink of
atrophy."238
The enactment of the IAS on January 6,1986 means that in
all civil actions in the supreme court and county courts, the
Master Calendar System has been replaced by an individual calendar system.237New uniform rules provide that a "preliminary
A fundaconference" may become a general part of litigati0n.2~~
mental purpose of the conference is to establish a timetable for
The objective is
the completion of all disclosure pro~eedings.2~~
to have the case ready for trial within one year after the judge
receives it.240This goal contemplates the active supervision of
If a party fails to comply with a judge's
cases by the judi~iary.2'~
order pursuant to the preliminary conference, the court may imId.
Id.
234 See note 192 and accompanying text supra.
235 See note 230 and accompanying text supra.
238 See D. SIEGEL,
supra note 29, 5 609, a t 874.
237 See N.Y. COMP.CODES
R & REGS.tit. 22, 8 202.3 (1986). The IAS is also being
applied in different levels of the trial courts. See id. a t 205.3 for the rules governing the
Family Court. For rules governing the Court of Claims, see id. a t $5 206.3 & 210.3. The
IAS is not used in the New York Civil Court or in the district courts. See id. a t $5 208.3,
212.3. See also note 175 and accompanying text supra.
23R See id. a t 3 202.12 (preliminary conference mandatory in most cases unless disclosure can be completed without court intervention). See ako The Preliminary Conference, supra note 175, a t 1. The court may order a conference as to any matter it finds
necessary. N.Y. COMP.CODESR & REGS.tit. 22,s 202.12(c) (1986). See also note 175 and
accompanying text supra. Title 22 of the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations has
been amended as of April 1, 1988 to make the mandatory preliminary conference
optional.
238 See The Preliminary Conference, supra note 175, a t 2.
Id.
N.S. COMP.CODESR & REGS.tit. 22, 202.3 (1986).
n3a
233
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pose sanctions.242Thus, the increased discretionary managerial
role of state court judges under the IAS is similar to that authorized by the SPCDD.24SThe major difference is that under
the SPCDD a judge is the fact finder2" and may order the parties to dispense with unlimited and burdensome disclosure.24s
Recently, a distinguished panel appointed by the Chief
Judge of the New York Court of Appeals found that the IAS is
not working effectively because judges do not make enough effort to force litigants to settle their disputes before going to
trial.246Several modifications to the IAS constituting significant
departures from the individual case method have been sugge~ted.~"A primary concern is that in 1987 eighteen percent of
civil cases lingered in the system longer than the fifteen month
disposition standard.248 Cases linger under the IAS because
judges do not have the time to actively supervise and facilitate
Full utilization of the SPCDD
settlement of complex rnatter~?'~
would enable judges to manage small claims more efficiently by
limiting pre-trial disclosure and by participating more actively
Use of the SPCDD, then, would
in settlement negotiati0ns.2~~
comply with the spirit and letter of the IAS by permitting
judges to devote more time to larger cases worthy of their
consideration.

B. Implementation of the SPCDD
In other jurisdictions, simplified procedural statutes such as
the SPCDD have been successfully implemented where the
bench and bar have cooperated to publicize the procedure
through continuing legal education programs, law journal artiSee note 176 and accompanying text supra.
See N.Y. CN. PRAC.L. & R. F( 3036 (McKinney 1974).
14' Id. at F( 3031.
2 4 V d .at 5 3036. See generally notes 184-85 and accompanying text supra.
2'6 See CHIEF
ADMINISTRATOR'S
REPORT,
supra note 5, at 1.
247 Id. at 8-19.
2'8 Id. at 7. See N.Y.S. UNIFIED
COURT
SYSTEM
OFFICE
OF MANAGEMENT
SUPPORT,
REPORT OF 1986 CASELOAD
ACTIVATING
THE SUPREME
AND COUNTY
COURTS
UNDER THE INDIVIDUAL ASSIGNMENT
SYSTEM,
table CV6 (Feb. 1987) (available at State of New York Office of Court Administration).
2'g See REPORT
TO THE CHIEFJUDGE,
supra note 5, at 8-9. See generally Wise, IAS
'Effective',supra note 4, at 1, col. 3.
REPORT
TO THE CHIEF
JUDGE,
supra note 5, at 10, 15.
2'2

243
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cles, and judicial information ~heets.2~'
For example, the California Continuing Legal Education bar conducted programs
throughout the state to alert lawyers to their Economic Litigation Program (ELP).262This program is similar in most respects
to the SPCDD. The Los Angeles Law Journal devoted substantial portions of two of its weekly publications to the ELP. Several courts attached bright yellow notices on the original summonses and defendants' first papers calling attention to the
pr0gram.2~~
Pennsylvania has undertaken similar steps to promote its Early Settlement Conferencing and Pretrial Evaluation
(Escape)
The New York State Bar Association has an active statewide continuing education office. Certainly programs similar to
those used in California could be presented on a regional basis.
Also, under the IAS each judge issues "information sheets" listing the particular rules of his or her court.2ssThese sheets could
call attention to the SPCDD. Special forms calling attention to
the SPCDD could also be attached for distribution whenever a
lawyer is assigned to a judge under the IAS.
Recently, a distinguished judge of the New York Court of
Appeals advocated the vigorous promotion of educational programs by law schools and bar associations to expand citizen
New York's five point educaawareness of ADR meth0ds.2~~
tional program to establish citizen justice centers will also inSimilar public relations efcrease awareness of ADR meth0ds.2~~
forts could be made on behalf of the SPCDD.

Over twenty percent of the nation's lawsuits will be filed in
New York state courts.268Last year New York state courts disEpstein, supra note 209, at 65.
Id. The Los Angeles County Bar Association, the Lawyers Club, the Association
of Southern California Defense Counsel and many other California bar groups have also
conducted educational programs on the ELP. Id. See notes 189,209-10 and accompanying text supra.
Epstein, supra note 209, at 65.
lM
Id.
285 See Carliile, supra note 1, at 85. See also note 218 and accompanying text supra.
Bellacosa, supra note 4, at 34, col. 5.
257 Id. See also note 225 and accompanying text supra.
258 See The Hon. Chief Judge Sol Wachtler, Remarbs at the Annual Dinner of the
New York State Bar Association (January 17, 1986) (available in the files of the Brook-
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posed of more cases than the entire federal judiciary.26@
Thus, it
makes good sense to emphasize ADR methods. These methods,
however, are often duplicative of functions performed by our
overworked judiciary.200If the purpose of our judicial system is
to resolve disputes, litigants should not be cost-factored out of
courts and forced to select ADR forums.
The SPCDD guarantees litigants access to efficient and inexpensive judge-rendered justice without compromising their
rights under the federal and state constitution^.^^^ It is particularly applicable to small tort cases, many of which do not require
the full adjudicative process. It is also compatible with judicial
management under the IAS and will serve as a worthwhile tool
for judges who seek to control their court calendars. This author
strongly encourages the implementation of programs designed to
heighten the bar's awareness to this simplified method of resolving disputes.

lyn Law Review).

Id.
Metaxas, supra note 16, a t 1 (distinguished commentators suggest that many
ADR forums are "a duplicative process that adds layers to an already overly complex
judicial system").
281 A fundamental tenet of due process is access to the courts. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV 3 2. The proliferation of ADR systems appear to restrict such access. See
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (prisoners guaranteed right of access to the
courts).
2=8

280
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